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Introduction
Passed in response to a series of highly publicized accounting scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is an ambitious anti-fraud bill that mandates a host of reforms designed to strengthen firms' corporate governance structures. Critics, however, argue that SOX is too costly and that some of the reforms may not only fail to strengthen corporate governance, but may actually weaken it. Supporting this criticism, a recent highly publicized study finds a large decline in stockholder value associated with the passage of SOX (I. . However, because bondholders also share in firm value, studies assessing the impact of SOX on stockholder value provide only a partial picture of SOX's impact on the firm. Thus, the purpose of this study is to examine the impact of SOX on bondholder value, an investor group that has not been previously considered in the SOX literature.
Examining the impact of SOX on the bond market is potentially informative for several reasons. First, bondholders represent an economically significant group of investors. For example, the US corporate bond markets have over five trillion dollars in nominal value at the end of 2001, equal to nearly one-third the size of the US equity markets, and are larger than the rest of the world's corporate bond markets combined (Molinas and Bales, 2002) . Second, if SOX is cost effective in reducing the incidence of fraud and improving financial reporting quality, then like stockholders, bondholders are also potential beneficiaries of SOX. Third, even if SOX imposes net costs on shareholders, as suggested in I. , it may still provide net benefits to bondholders, because stockholders have a residual claim on the firm and thus are first in line to bear the costs of SOX. Finally, while a large decline in the stock market potentially confounds stock price reaction studies (e.g., the S&P stock price index dropped by 21% from January through July 2002), the bond market was essentially flat prior to the passage of SOX, and hence bond price reaction studies do not suffer from this confound (e.g., the DataStream All-Traded bond price index increased by 3% over this period). 1 SOX may benefit bondholders in at least two ways. First, if SOX is successful in reducing the incidence of corporate fraud, then ceteris paribus, bondholders benefit from a reduced probability of default risk. This is because reducing the probability of fraud decreases the likelihood that firms will default on their bond obligations, particularly if SOX reduces the incidence of frauds that result in large corporate bankruptcies. Second, if SOX is successful in enhancing the quality of financial reporting, then ceteris paribus, bondholders are likely to have better information to assess the likelihood of default. This is consistent with J. who finds that bondholders of firms with more conservative financial reporting (a qualitative characteristic associated with enhanced financial reporting quality) demand a lower interest rate.
While bondholders may benefit if SOX successfully reduces default risk and/or increases financial reporting quality, a large body of research suggests that SOX may fail. For example, DeFond and Francis (2005) conclude that a large number of the provisions in SOX are unlikely to strengthen corporate governance, and that some provisions may even have the unintended consequence of weakening them, in which case SOX would impose costs, rather than benefits, on investors. Further, even if SOX does succeed in strengthening corporate governance, the associated costs may exceed the benefits, thereby increasing rather than decreasing default risk.
Thus, while bondholders are an investor group that potentially benefits from the governance 1 We emphasize that we are in no way asserting that market-wide movements confound the results in stock price studies of the adoption of SOX. Indeed, I. , for example, performs a multitude of tests that rule out this explanation. We are simply stating that market-wide movements are not a potential confound in studies of bond price movements as they are in stock price studies when evaluating market reaction during the passage of SOX.
reforms mandated by SOX, we are unable to predict whether SOX is likely to impose net benefits or costs on bondholders.
We investigate whether SOX results in net benefits or costs to bondholders by examining changes in corporate bond values surrounding the announcement of events leading up to the passage of SOX. While we do not predict the sign of the bond market's reaction, if market participants expect SOX to provide net benefits to bondholders, we expect bond values to increase around the announcement of news that the SOX reforms are closer to passage. In addition, if SOX provides net benefits to bondholders, we expect to find relatively greater net benefits among bondholders (1) in firms that are likely to experience the greatest changes to their governance systems under SOX because these are the firms that SOX implicitly intends to benefit most 2 and (2) of bonds with relatively high default risk because they benefit most from reducing the incidence of fraud and improving financial reporting quality.
Our empirical investigation consists of three analyses. Our first analysis investigates the cumulative change in corporate bond yield spreads (i.e., the difference between bond yield and the yield of a maturity-matched US government security) surrounding 17 events that are announced in the media during the seven-month period prior to the passage of SOX. These events, identified in I. , begin with the SEC Chairman's announcement of an "accounting overhaul plan" on January 16, 2002, and end with SOX passing the House and Senate with overwhelming majorities on July 25, 2002. While it is difficult to identify which particular events are likely to have increased or decreased the market's expectation that SOXlike reforms would become law, the market's expectation prior to our first event is likely to be 2 We focus on changes in governance (as opposed to other changes imposed by SOX, such as increased penalties for fraud or the ban on loans to officers) because the greatest emphasis of SOX is, arguably, on governance changes. In addition, information that allows us to assess the effects of governance changes are more easily obtained from publicly available data.
remote (Romano, 2005; Butler and Ribstein, 2006 Our second analysis examines the bond market's reaction across two partitions: (1) a "governance partition" that identifies the sample firms that are likely to experience the greatest governance changes under SOX, and (2) a "default risk partition" that identifies the sample firms with the highest default risk. We form our governance partition using a summary measure that combines five dichotomous variables based on the following governance characteristics: (1) the independence of the full board, (2) the independence of the audit committee, (3) the size of the audit committee, (4) the magnitude of non-audit services purchased from the incumbent auditor, and (5) the portion of audit fees unexplained by firm size. We form our default risk partition 3 The suddenness of the passage of SOX is captured in the following quote from a July 26, 2002 New York Times article: "Until a few weeks ago it seemed to have little chance of being approved by the Senate Banking Committee, let alone by the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, which initially passed a far weaker reform bill. Now, within days, President Bush is expected to sign into law a reform he could not quite bring himself to endorse explicitly as recently as July 9, when he came to Wall Street." 4 One advantage for using bond spreads rather than prices is that we are able to control for the impact of news about Sarbanes-Oxley on the economy-wide interest rates as well as macroeconomic news 5 We estimate that a 38 basis point increase in spread is consistent with a decline in bond prices of approximately 3%, assuming the average time-to-maturity and coupon rate of our sample bonds, and the average yield-to-maturity of Baa rated bonds in July 2002 (7.80%). Extrapolating this 3% price drop to the entire corporate bond market suggests an approximate loss of $150 billion in bond values (i.e., 3% times $5 trillion in nominal bond market capitalization at the end of 2001). using bond ratings. Based on a reduced sample of 1,219 bonds issued by 328 corporations with sufficient data, our analysis of the governance partition finds that bonds in both partitions of the data suffer a significant decline in value, and that the bonds issued by the firms expected to experience the greatest governance changes under SOX suffer a significantly greater decline in value compared to the bonds issued by the firms expected to experience the least governance changes. Our analysis of the default risk partition also finds that bonds in both partitions of the data suffer a significant decline in value, and that the bonds with the highest default risk suffer a significantly greater decline in value compared to the bonds with the lowest default risk. Thus, our analysis of the partitioned data suggests that the financial markets expected SOX to not only impose net costs on bondholders, but to impose the greatest costs on the firms it is intended to benefit most.
Our final analysis uses multivariate tests that regress our bond spreads on a dummy variable that captures our dichotomous summary measures of governance, a residual default risk measure (to capture a component of default risk that is not explained by our governance dummy), an interaction term of these two variables, several control variables capturing bond liquidity, and industry membership. This analysis finds that both our governance dummy and the residual default risk measure are associated with significant declines in bond values, and that the decline in value is significantly larger for the interaction term. Interestingly, our multivariate analysis also finds that firm size is positively associated with the increase in bond spreads, suggesting that the market expected SOX to be relatively worse news for larger firms. While there is evidence ex-post that SOX imposed differentially higher compliance costs (including audit fees) on smaller firms, our findings are consistent with market participants ex-ante expecting SOX to impose greater political costs on larger firms in the form of additional regulatory scrutiny (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) . It is rational for markets to expect SOX to differentially impact larger firms given that SOX's intent is to prevent financial failures such as those that occurred at Enron and WorldCom, two of the largest firms in the history of the US economy.
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In summary, the analysis of our full sample, our partitioned samples, and our multivariate tests are consistent with (1) bond values declining around the announcement of events leading to the passage of SOX, and (2) this decline being larger among bonds issued by firms that are likely to undergo the greatest changes to their governance systems under SOX and among bonds with higher default risk.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, ours is the first study to our knowledge that attempts to assess the impact of SOX on bondholders. While several prior studies examine the impact of SOX on stockholders, bondholders are also investors whose wealth is potentially impacted by SOX and who may benefit from SOX even if stockholders are harmed. In addition, while stocks suffered a market-wide decline in value of 21% over the time period covered by our events, corporate bond values were essentially flat. Thus, when compared to studies of stock price changes, one advantage of a study of changes in bond values is that market-wide changes in value are less likely to confound the results. Second, by finding evidence that bond market participants expect SOX to impose net costs on bondholders we add to the findings in I. by identifying another set of investors who appear to have suffered losses due to the passage of SOX. This is also consistent with the losses incurred by stockholders representing real economic losses for the firm as a whole, rather than wealth transfers from stockholders to bondholders. Third, by documenting that the net costs imposed by SOX are larger for firms that SOX is expected to impact most, we provide insights into the 6 Enron and WorldCom had market capitalizations of approximately $61 billion and $41 billion, respectively, one year prior to their bankruptcy filings. By comparison the mean and median market capitalization of our sample firms are approximately $11 and $4 billion, respectively. optimality of the corporate governance choices that SOX imposes on firms. Specifically, our results are consistent with the expected costs of the governance choices imposed by SOX exceeding their expected benefits. While this does not mean that all firms' governance structures were optimal prior to the changes imposed by SOX, it is consistent with market participants expecting the "one size fits all" governance choices imposed by SOX to move firms, on average, further away from optimal corporate governance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the motivation for our study. Section 3 discusses our sample selection procedures and presents the results of our analysis. Section 4 presents sensitivity tests and Section 5 discusses our conclusions.
Background and motivation

Prior SOX research
A large body of literature attempts to asses the impact of SOX on financial reporting quality, primarily by examining whether mandated changes under SOX are associated with outcomes related to improved financial reporting quality, such as management's propensity to make opportunistic accounting choices and the auditors' inclination to issue qualified audit opinions.
For example, because SOX bans the purchase of most non-audit services (NAS) from the incumbent auditor, several studies look for evidence of an association between NAS fees and financial reporting outcomes, such as discretionary accruals, the audit opinion, and financial restatements (e.g., Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew, 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam, 2002; Frankel, Johnson and Nelson, 2002; Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz, 2005; Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Reynolds, Deis, and Francis, 2004) . The majority of this research suggests that that the near-ban on NAS is unlikely to improve financial reporting quality, consistent with auditors' market-based incentives to maintain independence (that arise from reputational concerns and the threat of litigation) dominating the financial incentives to reduce independence (that arise from large NAS fees). Hiring the incumbent auditor to perform non-audit services may even benefit firms due to "knowledge spillovers," whereby client-specific information gained by the auditor while performing non-audit services is used to enhance the quality of the audit (Simunic, 1984) . If non-audit services result in knowledge spillovers that help the auditor perform a better audit, then banning such services may have the unintended consequence of weakening corporate governance.
In addition to studies that test whether specific provisions in SOX are likely to improve financial reporting outcomes, we are aware of three studies that attempt to assess the net impact of SOX by examining the stock market's reaction to the adoption of SOX. The study in this area that has received the most attention is I. , which examines the stock price reaction to 17 events disclosed in the media during the seven months prior to the passage of SOX, and finds a significantly negative market reaction. One of the surprising results in I. is the large magnitude of the equity market losses implied by the results. Specifically, the results are consistent with stockholders losing approximately $1.4 trillion around the adoption of SOX, with a 95% confidence interval from $238 billion to $2.6 trillion.
Contrary to the findings in I. , the other two papers examining the stock market response to the adoption of SOX find a positive reaction. Specifically, Rezaee and Jain (2003) and Li, Pincus, and Rego (2006) , using somewhat different methodology than used in I. , find positive abnormal returns around the final rulemaking events and conclude that investors expect SOX to be beneficial.
Thus, the empirical evidence is somewhat mixed on whether SOX helps or harms stockholders. As noted earlier, however, SOX's impact on stockholder value may differ from its impact on bondholder value. The next section discusses potential ways in which SOX may provide benefits or costs to bondholders.
The potential costs and benefits to bondholders from SOX
Bondholders may benefit from SOX in at least two ways. First, often referred to as an "antifraud" bill, SOX's primary objective is to protect investors from the large losses that follow corporate fraud. A reduction in fraud losses is expected to benefit bondholders, ceteris paribus, by reducing the probability of default risk. High profile frauds that occurred in companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Adelphia caused some of the largest bankruptcies in US history and resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in losses for investors.
7 If SOX successfully curbs investors' exposure to fraud losses, we expect bondholders to benefit. 7 The bankruptcies of these four listed companies are among the fifteen largest bankruptcies of all time, with WorldCom and Enron being the first and second largest (http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/15_Largest.htm).
8 However, if fraud risk (i.e., default due to fraud) is a diversifiable risk, then bondholders will not benefit from this aspect of SOX.
While SOX potentially benefits bondholders, the benefits may come at a high cost. For example, the Financial Executives Institute (FEI) reports that its member companies each spent an average of $4.3 million to comply the Section 404 requirements of SOX, more than 40 times greater than the SEC's original estimate of $91 thousand per firm (Butler and Ribstein, 2006) .
Evidence also indicates that audit fees have increased dramatically under SOX (GAO, 2006) and that the costs associated with boards of directors have risen sharply. For example, Linck, Netter and Yang (2006) report that Directors and Officers insurance has doubled since the passage of SOX and directors fees have increased by 56%. To the extent that these costs reduce expected cash flows, they reduce the benefits of SOX to bondholders. Thus, even if SOX benefits bondholders by reducing default risk and improving financial reporting quality, its high implementation costs may swamp these benefits.
In addition to the direct costs (e.g., the implementation cost of Section 404 and additional fees for auditors and directors), SOX may also result in large indirect costs. For example, if the "one size fits all" reforms prescribed by SOX are not the best governance practices for all firms in the economy, then SOX may actually destroy firm value. This would be the case, for example, if prior to SOX, managers had sufficient incentives to trade off the costs and benefits of various governance practices, and to adopt the set of practices that maximized their particular firm's value.may exceed those benefits. Consistent with this view, FEI reports that 94% of the financial executives responding to its March 2005 survey indicate that the costs of compliance with SOX outweigh the benefits (FEI, 2005) . However, whether the market expected the net effects of SOX to be positive for bondholders is an empirical question. 
Empirical analysis
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
We obtain bond prices, spreads, maturities, ratings and bond issue amounts from the Datastream database provided by Thomson Financial.
11 Datastream is widely used in studies of international equity prices and more recently in studies of bond prices (Chen, Lesmond, and Wei, 2006 Following prior literature (Elton et al., 2001) , we measure the change in bond values as the change in the yield spread, where the yield spread is defined as the corporate bond yield to maturity minus the yield to maturity of an equivalent-term government benchmark bond (i.e., a Treasury Note, Bond or Bill). 12 Since the yield spread primarily captures a bond's default riskpremium (Elton et al., 2001) , by measuring the change in bond value as the change in spread, we not only control for changes in market interest rates due to other unrelated contemporaneous 10 We note that many commentators currently conclude that SOX has indeed been successful. For example, a report from the Government Accounting Office in April 2006 asserts that "Regulators, public companies, audit firms, and investors generally agree that SOX has had a positive and significant impact on investor protection and confidence" (GAO, 2006) . And Representative Oxley recently declared that "Four years after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, investors and our capital markets continue to benefit from the legislation." (Thomasnet.com Industrial Newsroom, 2006) .
11 Datastream uses quotes from dealers at 4:00 pm each day. In the absence of quotes or trades, prices remain unchanged. 12 For bond maturities that do not exactly match the maturity of the available government benchmark bond, Datastream uses linear interpolation. For bonds maturities that are longer (shorter) than the longest (shortest) benchmark, Datastream uses the yield to the longest (shortest) benchmark bond .
events, but also control for information in the SOX announcements that could impact all interest bearing securities, such as information about expected inflation. database. This process yields a reduced sample of 1,219 bonds issued by 328 corporations.
To get an idea of the characteristics of the firms and bonds in our sample, Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the reduced sample (the sample for which descriptive information is available). We calculate the descriptive statistics for the firm-level (bond-level) variables using each firm (bond) as an observation. Not surprisingly, our sample firms are quite large, with mean and median total assets of $13 billion and $6 billion, respectively, as well as a mean and median market capitalization of $11 billion and $ 4 billion, respectively. By comparison, the median market capitalization of publicly-traded US firms covered in the CRSP database was less than $1 billion as of December 31, 2001. Table 2 also reports that the mean and median return 13 We restrict our observations to positive spreads. According to Thompson, a negative spread in their database occurs for one of two reasons. First, the bond was never priced or the supplier of the price discontinued pricing it. This gives an incorrect current price and, consequently, an incorrect yield value, which often results in a negative spread. Second, the bond is a "floater" (a bond whose interest rate floats with a benchmark rate such as a US Treasury), and the supplier of the price ceases to update the price. This results in an incorrect coupon value, which will have an incorrect yield value, and often results in a negative spread. on assets is 2.7% and 3.0%, respectively, and the mean and median leverage is 0.30 and 0.29, respectively. Finally, Table 2 shows that bond rating averages 9.1 (equivalent to a rating slightly below BBB), with a median of 9.0 (equivalent to a rating of BBB ).
14 These bond ratings indicate that our sample bonds tend to be relatively low risk, which is likely to bias our tests against finding any impact from SOX (since less risky bonds have less to gain from improved governance). In summary, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggest that our firms tend to be large, with bonds that have relatively low risk.
The bond market's overall reaction to SOX
Prompted by a series of alleged corporate governance failures that resulted in some of the largest bankruptcies in history, SOX was enthusiastically adopted into law in July 2002 by a vote of 99-0 in the Senate and 423-3 in the House of Representatives (Romano, 2005) . The legislative response that ended with the passage of SOX began in January 2002 and during the intervening seven months several events were announced in the media that are likely to have changed the market's expectations of the likelihood that major corporate governance legislation was likely to be adopted. Using the 17 key events identified in I. , we examine the cumulative change in yield spreads in an attempt to determine whether the financial markets expected SOX to increase or decrease bondholder value during this period.
To assess the cumulative effects of the SOX related disclosures over all of our event windows, we first sum the average of daily change in spread for our sample firms for each event window as follows:
Cumulative average
14 To facilitate the computation of descriptive statistics for bond ratings, we convert the letter rating to a numerical rating starting at 1 for AAA rated bonds and going to 21 for C rating bonds, including +/-rating categories.
where: difspread i = Daily change in spread for bond i; N = Total number of bonds in the corresponding (full or reduced) sample; T j = The number of trading days applicable for each event window.
We then add the cumulative average change in spread for each event window over the 17 event windows to measure the overall change in bond value during our sample period:
To test whether the cumulative average change in spread is significantly different from zero, we use a historical based student t-statistic that equals the cumulative change in spread of our sample bonds divided by the daily standard deviation of the change in spread of our sample bonds (adjusted from the number of days in each event window) during year 2001.
15 Table 3 reports the cumulative average change in spread and associated t-statistic for each of our event windows, and cumulatively across all event windows, for both the full and reduced samples. The last row reports that the cumulative average change in spread for the full (reduced) sample increased by 37.70 (33.79) basis points over all 17 event windows, with significance at p<1%. 16 Since the change in spread is inversely related to the change in bond value, our findings are consistent with the bond market expecting SOX to reduce bond values, on average.
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Figure 1 presents a graphical analysis that explores whether our results in Table 3 may be confounded by a general decline in bond values over the period of analysis. The figure indicates that while stock prices decline fairly precipitously over the seven months that span our event windows, bond prices do not exhibit a similar decline. Specifically, Figure 1 shows that while 15 We also report a sensitivity test after using a rolling student t-statistic measured as the change in spread divided by the standard deviation of the change in spread of our sample bonds during the 30 days immediately prior to each event window. The results of this sensitivity test are qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 3. 16 P-values in all analyses are two-tailed. 17 The mean spread in our full sample is 289 basis points over the period of our analysis, indicating that the decline of 38 basis points equals a 13% decline in spread (i.e., 38/289). stock prices decline by approximately 21% over the period of our analysis (based on the S&P 500 stock index), bond prices increase by approximately 3% (based on the Datastream AllTraded bond price index). Thus, our findings do not appear to be confounded by a general fall in bond prices over event periods. (Romano, 2005) . In this speech, Bush unveiled a ten-point plan that he claimed was designed to "improve corporate responsibility and protect America's shareholders." Thus, one explanation for the significant increase in bond values surrounding this event is that the bond market reacted favorably to the announcement of increased regulatory intervention. However, press reports of the reaction to Bush's speech suggest a more likely explanation is that Bush's proposals were weaker than the market had expected (Baue, 2002; Roth, 2002) . It was widely reported that Democrats and corporate activists complained that only one of the proposals in the President's ten-point plan required legislative action, and that the remaining nine were left to the SEC to implement, an SEC which was headed by Bush-appointee Harvey Pitt, who was widely viewed as pro-business (Baue, 2002) . In addition, the March 7 speech was also especially politically sensitive for Bush because Enron was his presidential campaign's biggest financial backer and Ken Lay was a frequent advisor to Vice-President Dick Cheney (Marketplace, 2002; Roth, 2002) . This meant that there was likely to be pressure, and consequently market expectations, for the White House to deliver a tougher set of reforms than were included in Bush's speech. Thus, it is likely that the increase in bond values around the time of Bush's March 7 speech resulted from the bond market's relief in finding out that Bush's proposals were unlikely to result in meaningful reforms.
Following Bush's speech in March, Table 3 reports that the next significant bond market reaction to a single event (where significance is measured as p<10%) did not occur until the lateJune announcement that WorldCom admitted to fraudulently understating expenses (event window 13). Bond prices then fell significantly again during three of the four remaining event windows (event windows 14, 16, and 17). The increasingly negative reactions beginning with the WorldCom disclosures are consistent with the speculation in Romano (2005) that the WorldCom fraud was a watershed event in gathering widespread bipartisan support for strong corporate reforms.
The significant negative market reaction in early July to event 14 probably results from this event signaling to the market that political pressures were forcing the Republicans to support the quick passage of strong corporate reforms (Butler and Ribstein, 2006) . While the Republicans traditionally fought against increased regulation, several factors made it politically costly for them to speak out against the SOX reforms. For example, mid-term Congressional elections were coming up in November, and the Democrats planned to use the wave of major accounting scandals during the first half of 2002 (Adelphia, Global Crossing, Tyco, Quest, Xerox and WorldCom) to make the Republicans appear weak on corporate responsibility (Murray and McKinnon, 2002) . Furthermore, pressure on the Republicans to allow meaningful reforms is likely to have increased significantly in early July when the press stories broke alleging corporate misconduct by President Bush while he was a director of Harken Energy. One story documented that Bush was late in notifying the SEC of a sale of Harken stock just prior to a drop in the share price (Harwood and Wessel, 2002) , and another story told of Bush receiving large loans from
Harken at below market rates (Lublin, 2002) . Following these press stories, during event 14, the President came out strongly in favor of legislative reform and the Senate unanimously voted to significantly toughen the provisions in SOX.
In summary, Table 3 presents evidence that the events leading up to the passage of SOX cumulatively reduced bond values. Thus, our results are consistent with the expected costs of SOX exceeding the expected benefits.
Bond market's reaction to SOX partitioned on governance characteristics and default risk
This section performs an analysis after partitioning the sample on firm and bond characteristics that are expected to identify firms that are most likely to benefit from SOX. If SOX is successful, we expect the greatest beneficiaries to be bondholders (1) in firms that are likely to experience the greatest changes to their governance systems under SOX, and (2) of bonds with relatively higher default risk.
Partitioning the sample based on firms most likely to be impacted by SOX's governance changes and bonds with the highest default risk
We form our governance partition using a summary measure that combines five governance characteristics that are expected to identify the firms likely to undergo the greatest governance changes as a result of the passage of SOX. We combine these five measures because we are interested in examining the bond market reaction to the firms that are impacted most strongly by SOX (as opposed to examining the bond market reaction to individual governance provisions).
That is, our summary governance measure is an equally-weighted aggregation of the five individual governance characteristics and captures the number of governance characteristics that are likely to undergo changes as a result of the passage of SOX. We construct this summary measure by first creating a dichotomous measure for each of the five governance characteristics, where a value of 1 indicates that the firm is more likely to undergo changes as a result of SOX, and 0 otherwise. We measure each characteristic as of the year end closest to December 31,
2001
. The following explains why we choose these particular governance characteristics and how we dichotomize them. 1) Board independence -A major objective of SOX is to increase board independence (Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2006) . While SOX's board independence requirements are limited to audit committees, during the SOX deliberations the SEC formally requested the NYSE and NASDAQ to review their corporate governance requirements for listed firms. After consultation with Congress and the SEC, the NYSE and NASDAQ responded by adopting new listing requirements that mandate a majority of the board of directors to be independent (NYSE Group, 2002) . 18 Consistent with these new requirements, Linck, Netter and Yang (2006) find that post-SOX boards are more independent and that this increase is greatest among firms with less independent pre-SOX boards. Thus, we code firms 1 if the percentage of independent board members is less than the population median and 0 otherwise. 19 If having a majority of independent board members improves governance, then, ceteris paribus, these firms are expected to differentially benefit.
2) Audit committee independence -Because SOX mandates 100% independent board members on the audit committee, we code firms 1 if there is less than 100% independent board members on the audit committee, and 0 otherwise. If SOX is correct in assuming that all firms are better off with 100% independent audit committee members, then these firms are expected to differentially benefit from SOX.
3) Audit committee size -In addition to increasing board independence, another major objective of SOX's governance measures is to impose new obligations and responsibilities on the audit committee (Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2006) . As a result, SOX mandates numerous changes that significantly increase the scope of the audit committee's duties. For example, post-SOX audit committees must consist entirely of independent directors (with a stricter test of independence), have at least one financial expert (or explain why they do not), take primary responsibility for hiring, firing and monitoring the external auditor, and oversee financial reporting and internal control disclosures (including the implementation of the extensive new requirements under Section 404). In addition, the new NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements that were adopted pursuant to SOX require a minimum audit committee size of three board members. This means that firms with relatively small audit committees are likely to have to add new members in order to comply with the new SOX requirements. Thus, we 18 The SEC made their request in February 2002. The NYSE and NASDAQ responded later that year by proposing several new governance requirements, including the requirement that a majority of directors be independent. Because of their ties to SOX, these newly adopted listing requirements are commonly referred to in the literature as having been adopted "pursuant" to SOX (e.g., Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2006) . 19 We use the population median as the benchmark cut-off because, as noted in our discussion of Table 2 , our sample firms tend to be larger and less risky than the population. Thus, the population is expected to better capture the firms that SOX is most (and least) likely to impact. code firms 1 if the audit committee (as a ratio of the total board) is smaller than the population median and 0 otherwise. 4) Auditor independence -A hotly debated SOX provision is a near-ban on purchasing nonaudit services from the incumbent auditor. This provision is based on the assumption that non-audit service fees provide auditors with financial incentives that impair their independence. Thus, we code firms 1 if the ratio of non-audit service fees to the total fees paid to the auditor is higher than the population median and 0 otherwise. If SOX is correct in assuming that non-audit service fees provide auditors with financial incentives that impair their independence, then these firms are expected to differentially benefit from SOX.
5) Internal control risk -Perhaps the most highly contentious SOX provision is Section 404, which attempts to improve internal controls over financial reporting. Among other things, this provision mandates the CEO and CFO to perform substantive procedures to assess the reliability of the internal control systems. It also requires the external auditor to audit the CEO and CFO's assessment and to perform their own independent audit of the internal controls. Thus, if Section 404 succeeds in improving governance, firms with higher levels of pre-SOX control risk should reap relatively greater benefits from SOX, where control risk is defined as the risk that the firm's internal controls will fail to prevent or detect a material misstatement (Messier and Emby, 2003) . Because control risk is not directly observable, we use the audit fee residual from a regression of the natural logarithm of audit fees on the natural logarithm of total assets as a surrogate, because a large body of literature provides theoretical and empirical support that firm size and control risk are important factors explaining audit fees (Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Pratt and Stice, 1994; Simunic, 1980) . By using the audit fee residual, our surrogate attempts to capture the internal control risk component of audit fee by removing the effect of firm size from the determinants of audit fees. We code firms 1 if the audit fee residual is higher than the population median and 0 otherwise.
Based on the summary governance measure, we construct our governance partition by classifying firms with summed values greater than or equal to the median as those likely undergoing the greatest changes as a result of the passage of SOX, and with summed values less than the median as those likely undergoing the least governance changes.
Finally, we form our default risk partition based on S&P bond ratings, with ratings worse than the population median of BBB indicating that the bond has a relatively high risk of default, and ratings better than or equal to the median indicating that the bond has a relatively low risk of default. As with the governance characteristics, we measure each variable as of the year end closest to December 31, 2001. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used to create our governance and default risk partitions. The third column of Table 4 presents the statistics for our reduced sample, the fourth column presents the statistics for the population, and the fifth column presents the pvalues for t-tests and Wilcoxon tests for the differences in the means and medians, respectively.
Descriptive statistics on measures used to create our governance and default risk partitions
To construct the population statistics, we use the IRRC database for board independence, audit committee independence, and audit committee size; the Audit Analytics database for auditor independence and internal control risk; and the Datastream database for bond ratings.
Under the heading SOX-related governance variables, Table 4 indicates that Board independence has a mean of 71% and median of 75% for our reduced sample, which is significantly higher than the population, and suggests that the new board independence rule by the major stock exchanges requiring a majority of independent board members is not binding for most of our sample firms. Audit committee independence has a mean of 92% and median of 100% for our reduced sample, which is similar to the population mean (91%) and median (100%), and suggests that the requirement to have 100% independent audit committees was met by the majority of our sample firms before SOX was enacted. Audit committee size has a mean of 38% and median of 36% for the reduced sample, similar to mean (39%) and median (38%) for the population and the descriptive information reported in DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) . Auditor independence has a mean of 61% and median of 64% for our reduced sample, indicating that on average, our sample issuers spent nearly twice as much on non-audit services as they did on audit services during 2001. We note that these numbers are both higher than the average and median ratios (both 47%) for the population, and the ratios (of around 50%) reported in prior studies (e.g., Francis and Ke, 2006; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson, 2002; DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam, 2002; Reynolds, Deis, and Francis, 2004) . 20 This suggests that our sample firms are larger users of non-audit services than the general population of firms. Internal control risk has a mean of 0.64 and a median of 0.66. The mean internal control risk for the population is 0.00 because it is the average of the residuals from an OLS regression (recall that this variable is measured as the residual from regressing the natural logarithm of audit fee on the natural logarithm of firm size). Finally, under the heading Default risk variables, Table 4 reports that Bond rating averages 9.1 (equivalent to a rating slightly below BBB) with a median of 9.0 (equivalent to the rating of BBB). Table 5 reports the cumulative average change in spreads over our event windows after partitioning the sample based on our summary governance measure. Specifically, we partition observations with values higher than or equal to the median value of the summary measure of the governance characteristics as the firms expected to experience the greatest governance changes, and the observation with values lower than the median as the firms expected to have the least governance changes. 21 Panel A of Table 5 reports that the cumulative average change in spread is about 45 (23) basis points for the firms expected to experience the greatest (least) governance changes, significant at p<1% (p<10%). Because spreads are inversely related to bond value, this means that the bond values in both groups experienced significant declines in value over our event dates. In addition, the difference in the change in spread across the two groups is significant at p<1%. Thus, this analysis finds that the bond price reaction among the firms expected to benefit most from SOX is significantly more negative than the bond price reaction among the firms expected to benefit least.
Univariate analysis of market reaction partitioned on governance changes and default risk
To get some insight into the behavior of the five factors underlying our summary governance measure, Panel B of Table 5 reports the cumulative average change in spread after partitioning the sample firms based on each underlying factor. Consistent with the results in Panel A, this analysis reports that the cumulative average change in spread in every partition is positive (significant at p<5%), indicating that bond values dropped significantly among our sample, irrespective of the expected impact of SOX. In addition, Panel B reports that the cumulative average change in spread is higher among the firms expected to experience the greatest changes under SOX for three of the five factors (with the difference significant at p<5%).
We note that we are not concerned with whether each individual factor identifies important differences across the sample, and thus it is inconsequential that two of the five governance factors have insignificant differences across their partitions. Rather, we are concerned with whether these factors collectively are able to distinguish between the observations that are likely to experience the greatest and least changes in their governance structures as a result of SOX. Table 6 reports the change in spreads over our event windows after partitioning the sample on default risk. This analysis reports that the cumulative average change in spreads is about 63 basis points for the bonds with the highest default risk, and about 18 basis points for bonds with the lowest default risk, both significant at p<5%. In addition, the difference in the cumulative average change in spread across the two groups is significant at p<1%. Thus, consistent with our analysis after partitioning on the summary governance measure, this analysis finds that the bond price reaction among the firms expected to benefit most from SOX is significantly more negative than the bond price reaction among the firms expected to benefit least.
Overall, our findings based on the governance changes and default risk partition are consistent with either (1) the SOX changes benefiting the firms with the greatest default risk but the costs exceeding those benefits, or (2) the SOX changes having the unintended consequence of resulting in poorer governance and thus imposing greater costs on the firms with the highest default risk.
Multivariate analysis of bond market's reaction to SOX
In this section we perform a multivariate analysis that addresses several issues. First, because bond ratings are expected to impound all available public information regarding default risk (such as information about firms' corporate governance structures), the association between the change in bond spreads and our default risk measure in the Table 6 analysis may be due to the portion of bond ratings that is explained by our corporate governance measure. That is, the significantly more negative reaction to riskier bonds reported may be the result of riskier bonds having governance structures that are likely to undergo the greatest changes under SOX. Second, if the firm's governance characteristics and the bond's default risk have independent effects on the market's reaction to the passage of SOX, we expect to find an interactive effect between our governance and default risk measures. Specifically, we expect to find a significantly larger increase in spread among bonds that are both in firms that undergo the greatest governance changes under SOX and that have the highest default risk. Finally, because the univariate analysis reported in Tables 5 and 6 do not control for potentially omitted correlated variables, differences in bond liquidity that are correlated with our governance and/or default risk measures potentially explain the associations found in that analysis. Table 7 presents coefficient estimates from regressing the cumulative changes in spread for each bond on dummy variables capturing our governance partition in Table 5 and our default risk partition in Table 6 , as well as variables that potentially control for the following factors: (1) bond liquidity (firm size and bond size), (2) firm financial characteristics (ROA and leverage), (3) bond term risk (years to maturity and modified duration), and (4) industry membership (industry dummies). We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of total assets of the issuer, bond size as the ratio of the amount of bonds outstanding divided by the total assets of the issuer, ROA as income divided by total assets, leverage as long term liabilities divided by total assets, years to maturity as the number of years left to maturity for each bond, modified duration (as defined in Datatstream) as the sensitivity of a bond's price to changes in yield, and industry membership based on the industry classification scheme in Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998) .
Models 1 and 2 in Table 7 sequentially include our governance and default risk partitions as dummy variables, along with our control variables. The regressions in Table 7 tell us whether the results on our governance and default risk measures reported in Tables 5 and 6 are likely to be explained by the factors captured by our control variables. Model 3 includes a residual default risk measure that is orthogonal to our governance dummy along with our control variables, where the residual default risk measure is calculated as the residual from regressing the default risk dummy on the governance dummy. 22 The significance of the coefficient on the residual default risk dummy in Model 3 tells us whether there are any elements of default risk that explain the change in spread beyond what is captured by our governance dummy. Model 4 includes both our governance dummy and our residual default risk measure along with our control variables. Model 5 adds the interaction between our governance dummy and our residual default risk measure.
Models 1 and 2 of Table 7 report significantly positive coefficients on the governance and default risk dummies at p<5% and p<1%, respectively. This finding is consistent with the results reported in Tables 5 and 6 , and indicates that firms with governance characteristics that are most likely to be impacted by SOX, and firms with the highest default risk, experienced an increase of 12.46 and 41.32 basis points in spreads during our event windows, respectively, relative to firms that are least likely to be impacted by SOX and firms with the lowest default risk, after controlling for firm size, bond issuance size, and industry membership. Model 3 reports that the residual default risk measure is statistically significant at p<1%, indicating that the change in spreads associated with our default risk measure is due to factors in addition to the factors captured in our governance dummy. Model 4 reports that the coefficients on the governance dummy and the residual default risk measure continue to be significant when included together in the regression, suggesting that the increase in spread (decrease in bond value) is significantly associated with both our governance dummy and the component of default risk that is not explained by the governance dummy. Finally, Model 5 reports that the coefficient on the interaction between the governance dummy and the residual default risk measure is significantly positive at p<10%. Thus, Model 5 indicates that there is a significantly larger decline in value among bonds in firms that both undergo the greatest governance changes under SOX and that have the highest default risk, consistent with each of these variables having independent effects. 
Sensitivity analysis
Using alternative t-statistic
We repeat our analysis in Table 3 using a rolling student t-statistic measured as the change in spread divided by the standard deviation of the change in spread of our sample bonds during the 30 days immediately prior to each event window. Consistent with the results currently reported in Table 3 , this analysis also finds that the cumulative average change in spread is significant at p<1%. Thus, our results do not appear to be sensitive to using this alternative statistic to test the significance of our Table 3 results.
Analyzing bonds issued by non-profit organizations
While the market-wide change in bond values was essentially flat over our event windows, we perform a test that attempts to assess whether our results are impacted by market-wide events impacting bonds. Specifically, we examine the change in spreads of bonds issued by non-profit organizations, because these bonds are traded on U.S. exchanges but are not subject to the provisions of SOX. This test finds no significant cumulative average changes in spread of nonprofit organizations around the time of our SOX event dates. Thus, our results do not appear to be driven by market-wide events.
Summary and conclusions
We examine the market reaction of corporate bonds in response to the events leading to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and find that the market responded negatively as evidenced by increasing yield spreads of straight corporate bonds. We also find that firms that are likely to experience greater changes in their governance systems under SOX and bonds that have a higher default risk experience a larger negative market response. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the view that the expected costs of SOX outweigh its benefits, 
Reduced sample 1,219 328
Variable definitions:
Spread: Yield to maturity of the bond minus the yield to maturity of an equivalent maturity government benchmark bond, expressed in basis points. When the maturity of a bond does not exactly match the maturity of the available government benchmark bond, linear interpolation is used. For bonds with a maturity longer (shorter) than the longest (shortest) benchmark, the yield is compared to the longest (shortest) benchmark. T is the time in years to the ith cash flow, and P is the current bond price. The population for board independence, audit committee independence, and audit committee size is based on all firms covered in the IRRC database. The population for auditor independence and internal control risk is based on all Big 5 audited firms covered in the Audit Analytics database. The population for the bond rating variable is based on all straight bonds with valid yield spreads over the SOX window covered by the Datastream database (essentially our full sample in Table 1 ). b Difference in mean is based on t-test; difference in median is based on Wilcoxon test. All p-values are two-tailed.
Board independence: Percentage of independent directors on board. a *** = p< 1%; ** = p< 5%; * = p<10%. All p-values are two-tailed.
Greatest (Least) changes: Observations with value higher than or equal to (lower than) the median value of the summary measure of governance characteristics. The summary measure of governance characteristics is the sum of dichotomous measures of each of the five governance variables reported in Table 4 . Specifically, the summary measure of governance characteristics ranges from 0 to 5 and aggregates the following factors: (1) whether the value of board independent is less than the population median; (2) whether the value of audit committee independence is less than 100%; (3) whether the value of audit committee size is below the population median; (4) whether the value of auditor independence is above the population median; (5) whether the value of internal control risk is above the population median. See Table 4 for definitions on other variables. a *** = p< 1%; ** = p< 5%; * = p<10%. All p-values are two-tailed.
Highest (Lowest) risk: Observations with bond ratings worse than (better than or equal to) the median rating of BBB. a *** = p< 1%; ** = p< 5%; * = p<10%. All p-values are two-tailed.
Cumulative change in spread: The cumulative daily change in spread for each bond over the entire sample period. 
